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Reflection as the Core of Supervision  
TK Lang and Karl-Erik Tysk 
The overall purpose of this essay is to present a language- and mean-ing-generating system perspective on reflection as the core activity in supervision. Based on our practice as supervisors over more than 
three decades, we have come to see and believe in the incalculable value of 
what we understand to be a dynamic system of meaning and understanding 
that develops in supervisory groups. 
In this essay, we will explore the complementary relationships between 
thought and language and between understanding and social interchange 
in our professional practice as supervisors. And finally, we will discuss how 
“real understanding and communication will be achieved only through 
generalization and conceptual designation of my experience,” as empha-
sized by Vygotsky.1 Since praxis typically appears before nomos throughout 
history as well as in human development,2  before presenting our philoso-
phy of supervision, we will show how a supervision session based on our 
philosophy of language is done in practice.
122
A SupERviSoRy SESSion
Torstein is a chaplain in a very large public hospital. His supervisory 
group consists of seven of his colleagues plus the supervisor. It is an open, 
ongoing group that meets 90 minutes every other week, and the group has 
met for the past three decades. He presents the following narrative to the 
supervisory group.
For some months, Torstein had followed a male cancer patient who has 
been both an in-patient and an out-patient in the hospital’s palliative care 
program. The patient had lately deteriorated, been in a lot of pain, and was 
partially paralyzed. Torstein tells the group that the man had had many 
regrets. He had been looking back on his life and the pain he had caused 
others. 
“I shared Communion with him,” Torstein says, and continues: “I wish 
I could have eased his pain! . . . He died yesterday night. I found out when 
I called an hour before I was supposed to visit him at home, as I was accus-
tomed to doing. He had been riddled by pain, but when I came to his home 
and saw him lying dead in his bed, he looked so relaxed and as if he was 
smiling. . . . He had wanted to die at home, and be carried out ‘with his feet 
first,́  as he had put it. So, he died the way he wanted to.”
Then Torstein starts to reflect on his own life: “How am I put together . 
. . I mean . . . am I a participant or an observer? . . . What about this theme of 
‘closeness and distance´ that we so often speak about? . . . I am holding back 
when it comes to bonding. . . . I keep myself back because [he starts crying 
quietly] . . . I am crying, obviously, because I am engaged.”
He stops his narrative at that point and says: “Yeah, I think that’s my 
story.” He then turns his chair and places himself outside the circle we are 
sitting in, with his back towards the group. 
The supervisor then addresses the group, saying: “Torstein says . . .” 
and points to one of the group members, who says: “I can start!” And then 
the group members retell the story Torstein has told using his own words, 
as in a recorded dictation or as if reading from a verbatim transcription. The 
first person repeats most of the story, and the other members add only what 
the others have missed. The whole narrative is complete when everybody 
has added their lines of what they heard that has yet not been repeated. 
Some group members have noted on paper significant expression or formu-
lations, helping them to remember the exact words Torstein used.
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This recounting done, the supervisor asks Torstein, who is still sitting 
with his back to the group: “Have we heard you?” Torstein confirms that the 
group has heard him, and he adds something about the importance of what 
he has discovered while listening to the group, something that he had not 
said earlier, and then he corrects something that was repeated incorrectly. 
“Okay, we’ll include that,” says the supervisor, and then continues 
while Torstein is still sitting with his back to the group: “So, what does Tor-
stein’s narrative bring forth in us? Questions? Comments? Our own expe-
riences? Or does any material from professional journals or books come to 
mind?”
The members of the group share, one after another, whatever comes to 
mind in response to Torstein’s story. One says, “I listened to his story and 
felt like I was there in the room with him and this man. It was just beauti-
ful work!” 
Then the next: “I became curious about what he meant when he said: 
‘How am I put together, holding back when it comes to bonding.́  And then 
when he started crying, I heard him saying that he was crying because he 
was engaged, while I was thinking he was crying out of loneliness, as in 
feeling that he was an observer and not able to feel like a participant in the 
fellowship or Communion this situation invited him to.” 
And then another: “ He said he wished he could have taken the pa-
tient’s pain away, and I am curious about how Torstein sees the sharing he 
had with this man of the Holy Communion within the framework of what 
he just told us?”
Yet another: “Of course Torstein cried! For heaven’s sake, we as chap-
lains grieve, too!”
“Well,” says another, “I was just wondering about the funeral. Is Tor-
stein going to be the minister conducting the funeral? That often brings good 
closure both for him and for the family if, as I understood from Torstein, 
they have participated in and have had a difficult time together throughout 
this man’s terminal illness.” 
This response round goes fairly quickly. Torstein and his story are 
talked about behind his back, literally, and in the third person. He is not 
allowed to address the group, and the group does not talk directly to him. 
Torstein has a little notebook in which he writes down whatever comes to 
mind while he is listening to the group repeating his story verbatim-like 
and sharing whatever his story brought forth.
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Then Torstein returns to the circle and the supervisor asks: “Have we 
been close to anything having to do with you in our responding, or have we 
just taken off into our own worlds or fantasies?” 
Torstein then tells the group that he did not hear what everybody was 
saying in their responses. All of a sudden, while one group member was 
focusing on his sudden tears, he was thinking he might have cried out of 
the feeling of loneliness about being an observer who was not able to par-
ticipate in the communion this situation invited him into: “When you said 
this, Lars, I all of a sudden saw what I hadn’t told you. When I came home 
from work that day, my wife had unexpectedly made a special dinner out 
of pure happiness over our family situation. And I felt awful! I just smiled, 
ate, and was polite and correct. But I was not there! And I was not able to 
share that with her! And it is so terribly lonely not being able to share with 
her the strong emotional situations I’ve been in at work. And she just keeps 
talking and does not even realize that I’m not mentally there.” Then silent 
tears run down his cheek again while he continues: “It felt so good to tell 
my story here today, particularly sitting outside the circle and listening to 
you retelling my story in minute detail. I became really emotional hearing 
myself having been heard!” 
Then Torstein’s silent tears return before he continues: “I understood 
while sitting listening to you that this didn’t in fact have much to do with 
this man and my being with him. While I listened to you, not seeing you, 
not having to explain or defend what I had told you but just sitting there lis-
tening to my own narrative and what you were reading into it, what I heard 
you had seen in my story, then I realized, as I sat there talking to myself,3 
what I in fact was communicating to you. I saw myself as being very good 
at helping suffering people, and I know that others need me. But what made 
me cry is that I feel that nobody really knows me. And, that I often feel very 
lonely and not seen by those close to me, my family and friends. But then 
again, how could they ever? I withdraw. I don’t share.4 How could they pos-
sibly know—when I’m not revealing myself to them?”
The supervisor decides, at this moment, to place Torstein outside the 
circle again, and the group members once more retell what they have heard 
and then share with Torstein whatever reflections, experiences of their own, 
professional knowledge, or emotional support this second story of his has 
brought forth in them. 
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Torstein then returns to the circle and shares the thoughts and feelings 
that occurred to him while he was sitting outside the circle. His feedback 
results in shorter or longer dialogues between him and various members of 
the group and among the group members themselves for the rest of the ses-
sion. When about five minutes are left, the supervisor says: “Okay, Torstein, 
the last couple of minutes are yours.” And then the session is over.
ThE STRuCTuRE of ThE SupERviSoRy SESSion
Supervision always takes place within a social and institutional con-
text. Of the many different ways supervision is done, our way presupposes 
that the participants are professionals who are actively working with peo-
ple. They may work within a church context or within health care, social 
services, correctional, or school systems. 
However, no matter what profession the participants belong to, they 
seek supervision to sustain and improve the quality of their professional 
work and of their own personal lives and health as professionals. There is 
no explicit feedback between the supervisor and the institutions the super-
visees belong to except in relation to matters that concern the practicalities 
of the supervisory process.
Before we go further in identifying and articulating the philosophical 
foundations of our supervisory practice and exploring our main subject, re-
flection as the core of supervision, we will briefly describe the underlying 
structure of our practice.
Each supervisory group is a contract-based social context. The term 
contract is here understood to be the moral obligation agreed upon by the 
participants, which secures and optimizes the context within which su-
pervision takes place. The supervisory sessions do not follow a particular 
method but instead are to be understood as a structured experience, much 
like a liturgy.5 
Each session starts with the supervisees reporting back from the last 
gathering or sharing what they have thought or done since then. The person 
granted the time for that day’s session then tells her story from an event in 
her practice, just as Torstein did above. The story is about an experience that 
is important for the supervisee. She might not be content with the outcome 
of her actions, or she may not understand what took place, and therefore she 
wants to share it with the group to get their reflections on what happened 
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or what could have been said or done differently. Her issue might concern 
something in the past or something she is presently dealing with or will 
have to handle in the future. 
While the narrative is being shared, the group listens. The group mem-
bers may be writing down what they are hearing or thinking while listen-
ing. After the story is told, the storyteller is placed outside the circle the rest 
of the group is sitting in. The storyteller sits with her back to the group, with 
a notebook for writing down her thoughts and comments while sitting with 
her back to the group. 
The group members then recount, using the storyteller’s own words, 
what she has said (the “parrot round”).6 In this way, she becomes a listener 
to, and an observer of, her own story. There is no communication through 
verbal or facial expressions between her and the rest of the group during 
this retelling of her narrative. 
The supervisor asks if the group has accurately retold what she said. 
She confirms this or adds corrections. This being said, it is also true that 
we often experience that the person sitting outside the circle all of a sud-
den breaks out, saying: “Oh, now I know!” She says this as if the insight is 
something happening to her, an event she is participating in. This can be the 
starting point for new, fresh action
Then, with the storyteller still sitting with her back to the group, the 
supervisor asks the group members to share their questions, experiences, 
thoughts, and related readings that popped up in response to the story they 
have listened to (the “reflection round”). There might also be a few thoughts 
spontaneously expressed between the group members that were triggered 
as they listened to each other’s responses to the story. The group talks about 
the person sitting outside the circle  in the third person, literarily speaking 
behind her back. This is in accordance with Levinas’s observation that the 
person acting is exposing and revealing herself in what she says and does.7 
But in the story that is told, the storyteller herself is only seen indirectly 
as the responsible acting subject. The group’s reflection on what she has 
thought or done is formulated about her as the acting subject in the story, in 
the third person. 
Once the reflection round is completed, the storyteller rejoins the cir-
cle. The supervisor asks her if the group has focused on themes that relate 
to her understanding or were caught up in their own agendas. She, in turn, 
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tells the group what she has been thinking while sitting outside the circle 
listening. 
She might share her reflections on the story told and the group’s re-
sponses in a way that opens up dialogue in the group. Or, she may tell a 
completely new story about what it really was all about that she was not 
aware of before listening to her own story being retold or reflected on by the 
group. This is what happened with Torstein, described above.
If a new story occurs, she is placed outside the circle again and the 
group goes through the same procedure once more. If not, she is engaged in 
dialogue and conversation within the group during the rest of the supervi-
sory session. And, the storyteller always gets the last word. 
SupERviSion
We are using the English word “supervision” for what we are dis-
cussing here. Our use of this term has nothing to do with the etymologi-
cal meaning of that expression, with its hierarchical connotation. Its Swed-
ish and Norwegian counterparts handledning (“leading by the hand”) and 
veiledning(“leading the way”) are a little better but are nevertheless far from 
satisfactory because they are not sufficiently egalitarian. This qualification 
is necessary because we want to distance ourselves from the traditional po-
sition of the supervisor as an expert on human beings, human lives, and 
communication. 
We think, instead, that the supervisor should take part in supervision 
from what has been called a not-knowing position throughout the dialogue8 
and meet the supervisee as a person neither fully known to the supervisor 
nor to herself. Supervision is based on curiosity on the part of both the su-
pervisor and the supervisee. Apparently, curiosity is linked to reflection. A 
person who is curious about herself and others is probably more open to re-
flection about her own as well as other persons´ thoughts and actions, and 
those who are not self-reflective are certainly not curious about themselves. 
The supervisor and the supervisee are in a certain respect on the same level, 
and the former is only an expert in creating a favorable space for mutual re-
flection, i.e., an expert on process but not on content. 
We understand supervision to be a creative social field constituted by 
the participants bringing with them their personal and professional knowl-
edge and experience. The underlying attitude is related to the fact that every 
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authentic meeting brings forth something new that was not there before the 
meeting took place.9 
Creation only takes place when at least two people come together. The 
point is that our own experience is unfulfilled if it stands alone. Since lan-
guage by definition is intersubjective, it follows from this that the individ-
ual perspective is left behind and is replaced by the social perspective. The 
world is constituted not by the private, autonomous individual but inter-
subjectively through dialogue. What is not communicated is not yet real-
ity; it does not have solid ground. Therefore, the understanding developed 
through supervision is something that we participate in. It happens to us in 
the dialogue. It is not a result of our own doing.10 As theologians, we are cer-
tainly aware of the fact that the individual (Adam) is not created alone and 
that only in communion with the other (Eve) does he become aware of him-
self (gen. 3). Human beings are seen all the time in the Bible as members of a 
community, both in the Old Testament as the people of god and in the New 
Testament as members of the body of Christ (1 Cor. 12).
From our point of view, supervision depends on the creation of a room 
for professionally engaged people to reflect on their own responsibility for 
their work, just as humans are dependent on the world god has created and 
Adam is held responsible for his actions in the garden of Eden. Supervision 
provides professionals with a position to reevaluate their actions, learn from 
them, and if necessary change them. This is why supervision should be an 
integral part of every professional’s work. Supervision and being a profes-
sional are, as we see it, intrinsically connected.
Central to our approach is the idea that reflection is done through nar-
ration in a dialogue. Here, narration simply means storytelling. This is why 
group supervision offers more resources than individual supervision. In a 
group, more narratives, or stories, about the issue in the supervisee’s story 
may come forth than in individual supervision, and this enlarges the cre-
ative field.
Over the years we have developed our thinking in many papers, arti-
cles, and books written in Swedish and Norwegian.11 In addition to theologi-
cal reflections, our work is based on themes emerging from the Houston-
galveston circle around Harold goolishian and Harlene d. Anderson12 and 
has affinities to many similar psychotherapeutic frameworks, such as those 
initiated by Tom Andersen13 at the University of Tromsø, Norway, and Jaako 
Seikulla14 at the University of Kuopio, Finland. These thinkers challenge the 
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expert – nonexpert dichotomy and the hierarchical structures that it gener-
ates. Instead, they seek to develop a collaborative approach to therapy, and 
it is this thinking that we are adapting to the supervisory field. 
This has for us actualized the philosophical foundation of our under-
standing, which has been laid by philosophers as such as Karl Jaspers, Han-
nah Arendt, Paul Ricoeur, Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, Ludwig Wittgen-
stein, Emmanuel Levinas, and Hans-georg gadamer. We will try to show 
what we have learned from some of them as we reflect on supervision. 
Mikhail Bakhtin provides a framework for thinking about how we 
have been changed while studying these thinkers; we become the voices 
that inhabit us. Through conversation with those voices, we are constantly 
formed and reformed. Therefore, in the rest of this article some of these 
voices will be heard as quotations that have contributed to our own under-
standing of what supervision is about. These voices have changed our way 
of comprehending and practicing supervision over the years. They have 
taught us the important characteristics of real dialogue, which are that the 
dialogue should be as egalitarian as possible and that it is always multidi-
mensional or “polyphonic,” as Bakhtin puts it, and made up of stories. 
We have applied the thinking of the philosophers named above to the 
field of supervision, so we might be regarded as belonging to the hermeneu-
tical tradition. We are nevertheless keen to underline our unwillingness to 
be classified as representatives of a particular school. 
In our theoretical as well as practical work, we concentrate on ordi-
nary language and conversation, not allowing technical terminology or con-
structed theories to alienate those participating in the supervisory sessions 
nor the theoreticians who want to reflect upon them. The richness of com-
mon language is sufficient for both supervisory practice and its foundation-
al considerations. 
REfLECTion: inTERioR and ExTERioR
For our purposes, we understand reflection as an interior scrutinizing 
of one’s thoughts and actions, a critical introspection, as well as an exterior, 
social act of reflecting together. When I reflect, I have a tacit conversation 
with myself, which is considered self-reflection. I withdraw from the outer 
world and concentrate on what I have thought, felt, said, and done. The con-
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tent of my consciousness is one of the subjects in my reflection in supervi-
sion. Other subjects can be the stories produced by others. 
The result of my reflection is something that is present only to myself. 
But, as Bakhtin maintains,
Like the word, the idea wants to be heard, understood, and “answered” 
by other voices from other positions. Like the word, the idea is by nature 
dialogic. . . . The idea is inter-individual and inter-subjective—the realm 
of its existence is not individual consciousness but dialogic communion 
between consciousnesses.15
I can only reflect if I stop acting in relation to what is in the world around 
me. daily life, therefore, is an obstacle to reflection. 
Even though every human is created with the capacity to think, it has 
been argued that certain persons lack the ability to reflect. Hannah Arendt 
deepened our understanding of thinking and reflection as a basic human 
activity. Arendt was a political theorist who initiated her studies on reflec-
tion when writing about Adolf Eichmann and his inability to realize the 
moral implications of what he had done during the Nazi era. He was, ac-
cording to her, not capable of self-reflection. Later, she continued to reason 
about human thinking and perhaps modified her views. She seems more 
optimistic when she writes:
Thinking in its non-cognitive, non-specialized sense as a natural need of 
human life, the actualization of the difference given in consciousness, is 
not a prerogative of the few but an ever-present faculty in everybody; 
by the same token, inability to think is not a failing of the many who 
lack brain power but an ever-present possibility for everybody—scien-
tists, scholars, and other specialists in mental enterprises not excluded. 
Everybody may come to shun that intercourse with oneself whose fea-
sibility and importance Socrates first discovered. Thinking accompanies 
life and is itself the de-materialized quintessence of being alive; and since 
life is a process, its quintessence can only lie in the actual thinking process 
and not in any solid results or specific thoughts. A life without thinking 
is quite possible; it then fails to develop its own essence—it is not merely 
meaningless; it is not fully alive. Unthinking men are like sleepwalkers.16 
But, notwithstanding this, it seems important to distinguish between think-
ing and reflection because reflection can be seen as a way to examine our 
thinking, a meta-activity or second-order form of thinking. Supervision is 
intended to help professionals to activate their capacity to reflect, if they are 
actually able to do it. In our experience, we have found that a certain per-
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centage of professionals do not break this code of reflection. They remain 
alien to genuine dialogue and often find their ways into hierarchical posi-
tions where they use power and social control as tools for self-realization. 
Self-reflection on its own, however, is not enough, because my perspec-
tive is limited, for example, by the cultural and social contexts from which I 
view myself and the world around me. To transcend this limitedness, I need 
to communicate with persons holding different perspectives than my own. 
This is the essence of supervision. Communicating with others gives me as 
a professional person what I need. Although there is no guarantee that ev-
ery member of a supervisory group is capable of self-reflection, the group 
gives those who are capable of it the opportunity for such reflection and for 
sharing it with others. 
What I gain for myself alone in reflection would—if it were all—be as 
nothing gained. What is not realized in communication is not yet, what is 
not ultimately grounded in it is without adequate foundation. The truth 
begins with two.17
When the supervisee’s story, the story about herself as a professional, is told, 
her intentions and goals are revealed. They might well be hidden to the sto-
ryteller herself but be obvious to the listeners. What the supervisee has done 
or is planning to do and tells the group about springs forth from her reason-
ing. In supervision, we do not talk about the results of the intended action of 
the supervisee. What we focus on is how the results are understood by the 
supervisee in relation to her intentions and goals. 
How the person(s) affected by the actions of the supervisee reacted or 
will react, we do not know. But what we do know is how the story told af-
fects the members of the supervisory group and makes them think and feel 
about what they have heard. This is offered by the group to the supervisee 
as a possible representation of how it could have been experienced by the 
person(s) told about in the supervisee’s story. This may be helpful for the 
person seeking supervision because, as we know, the most original product 
of the supervisee’s actions is not the realization of her intentions or goals but 
the unintended story that can be told after the experience.18 The stories told 
by the members of the group as a response to the supervisee’s story may 
become integrated as part of the supervisee’s own professional history and 




This is an example of why my own reflection is not complete if it stands 
alone but needs to be communicated and responded to and thereby comple-
mented. It is also an example of how everyday life experiences and expec-
tations need to be talked about and responded to. This is true not only for 
professional life but for life in general.
REFLECTION AND CONSCIENCE
Self-reflection is related to what is called conscience (Latin: conscientia, 
to know together with). I know together with myself. But I also know to-
gether with others, whose voices can be heard in my inner polyphonic con-
versation with myself. 
Conscience reveals itself as an afterthought, a reflection on what I have 
thought, said, and done. It functions as a corrective in relation to my future 
actions. This can also be said about supervision, which nurtures my inner 
conversation. When I am about to act, I can hear the voices from a supervi-
sory session that guide me directly or indirectly by making me anticipate 
reflections in a future session. It could be said that my conscience is a tool of 
reflection, my most important one. This anticipation is elegantly formulated 
by Zygmunt Bauman:
Lives lived and lives told are for that reason closely interconnected and 
interdependent. One can say, paradoxically, that the stories told of lives 
interfere with the lives lived before the lives lived have been lived to be 
told.19
This interaction between lives and stories, in our view, seems to be intrin-
sic. In a broader context it also means that a human being is fundamentally 
social and socially interdependent. Stories and lives interact with each other 
in a complex way to form a social context.
THE MORAL IMPACT OF REFLECTION
Language and supervision are intimately intertwined. In conversation 
and dialogue, we necessarily make use of language. It has been argued that 
speech and morality are intrinsically related. One of the strongest adher-
ents to such a view is the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas. When we 
communicate with the Other, we are entering into a field of moral obliga-
tion that makes us morally responsible for that person, even if the field also 
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contains a kind of sensibility, the Other ś face. We have a responsibility to-
wards the person we are speaking with. In an interview, Levinas explains 
this as follows:
When I talk about responsibility and obligation, and consequently about 
the person with whom one is in a relationship through the face, this per-
son does not appear as belonging to an order which can be ‘embraced’, 
or ‘grasped’. The other, in this relationship of responsibility, is, as it were, 
unique: ‘unique’ meaning without genre. In this sense he is absolutely 
other, not only in relation to me; he is alone as if he were the only one 
of significance at that moment. The essence of responsibility lies in the 
uniqueness of the person for whom you are responsible.20
It can be difficult to understand how this component of responsibility re-
lates to dialogue,21 but for our purpose it is sufficient to agree with Levinas 
that dialogue somehow involves the moral point of view. Therefore, moral-
ity can be seen as an important part of the supervisory project. The supervi-
sor is in this respect asymmetrically responsible for the supervisee.
It might seem that we contradict our nonhierarchical way of supervis-
ing by introducing a moral hierarchy. But we do this while maintaining a 
clear distinction between the professional attitude of the supervisor and the 
moral obligation when facing human beings, which according to Levinas is 
asymmetric and therefore in some sense hierarchical. 
If we then turn to reflection, the moral point of view is also actualized. 
Because of its relation to conscience, reflection has an intimate relation to 
morality. My conscience tells me what is right and wrong and helps me to 
act in accordance with that. It functions as a prosecutor who accuses me con-
cerning what I have done or said and will not be silent until I have pleaded 
guilty of my act and am prepared to correct it. On the other hand, my con-
science is like an advocate who defends me until I myself realize that what 
I have done is right. It seems that reflection, the conversation between me 
and myself, is a necessary condition for my conscience to function in this 
way. According to Levinas, when facing the other I become critical in rela-
tion to myself. “It is to be like a stranger, hunted down even in one’s home, 
contested in one’s own identity.”22 
This may sound self-destructive, but for professionals in responsible 
positions it can actually become devastating. They can stop trusting them-




In supervisory reflection, this self-critical voice can obtain a possibly 
reassuring answer. Supervision helps the supervisee by acknowledging the 
limitations of her possibilities so that she can accept herself and her acts as 
optimally executed under nonoptimal conditions. We sometimes need to be 
reminded that because we are finite, limited creatures, our failings or mis-
takes are also finite (most of the time).
REFLECTION ON PROFESSIONAL ACTIONS
Because supervision is a form of reflection, it has moral implications. 
This has to do with professional actions that are under judgment, what we 
in supervision call “reflecting over practice.” It concerns both the super-
vised professionals and other persons´ well-being, those who experience 
the supervisee in everyday life. In supervision I am summoned as a profes-
sional to responsibility by the other members of the supervisory group. I am 
held accountable for what I have done and said.
Action does not express. It has meaning, but leads us to the agent in his 
absence. To approach someone from works is to enter into his interiority 
as though by burglary; the other is surprised in his intimacy, where, like 
personages of history, he is, to be sure, exposed, but does not express him-
self. Works signify their author, indirectly, in the third person.23 
When I realize through the dialogical reflection in the supervisory group 
that there are alternatives to what I have said or done, I am often liberat-
ed from what might have constrained me, and thereby I am set free to act 
in a new way as a morally responsible person. This is in accordance with 
Paul Ricoeur, who argues that “the passage from inadequate ideas, which 
we form about ourselves and about things, to adequate ideas signifies for us 
the possibility of being truly active.”24
Our joint reflections can liberate us from the inadequate ideas that 
have generated actions that became problematic for us, first in our inner 
conversation and then in sharing our thoughts with the participants in the 
supervisory group. This is why we emphasize that we do not talk about su-
pervision as a method that can be used to reach a certain goal. It is more like 
a revelation than a result of methodical action. In the dialogic approach to 
supervision, this has been described as a dissolution of the problem, not a 
solution.25
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ThE SToRy ToLd in SupERviSion
In supervision I, as a professional, tell my story about what I want to 
reflect on. We agree with Ricoeur, who states: “We tell stories because in 
the last analysis human lives need and merit being narrated.”26 I do this in 
a group led by a professional supervisor. The group is constituted of par-
ticipants who have agreed upon a contract defining the framework within 
which the supervision takes place. My reflection is no longer an inner con-
versation but is communicated through language with others in a dialogue. 
It is in this way similar to everyday conversation. It is a conversation in 
which the participants are obliged to be especially alert, curious, and re-
sponsible for my well-being in the group. Together with me, the supervisee, 
they will openly reflect on what I am telling them. My inner voices are be-
ing joined by all the voices that can be heard in the supervisory room. This 
means that the space of reflection offered me will increase with every new 
perspective that is shared. 
Storytelling is an essential part of our lives. We can almost say that a 
human being is a homo narrans.  It is also true that I am what I say, not what 
I say I am.27 Hannah Arendt has paid great attention to this narrative aspect 
of human life: No philosophy, no analysis, no aphorism, be it ever so pro-
found, can compare in intensity and richness of meaning with a properly 
narrated story.28 The focus in supervision, however, is on the content of my 
consciousness, not on the issues shared; i.e., it is on the relation between me 
and whatever I tell about. This relation is expressed in the language used to 
formulate the story, which is loaded with meanings and judgments made by 
me when I am telling the story. To choose words and expressions is an act of 
both moral and epistemic concern. This is valid for both the supervisees and 
the supervisor. The story I tell helps to connect and constitute the meaning 
of the elements that make up the situation that I am reflecting upon, espe-
cially those elements that I am concerned about. These are often called prob-
lems, themes, or concerns. 
As conscious human beings, we are entangled in stories. The story that 
I share in supervision emerges from this entanglement and has a long his-
torical background.29 It could be compared to what in hermeneutics is called 
Vorverständnis (“preunderstanding”). This history can be experienced as one 
of those bonds that I can be liberated from in supervision, which means that 
my Vorverständnis is corrected during the supervisory session.30
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Ludwig Wittgenstein notes that we are caught in our frames or in a 
particular picture that is an integral part of our language:
“But this is how it is . . .” I say to myself over and over again. I feel as 
though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact, get it in 
focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter. 
(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.5): “The general form of propositions 
is: This is how things are.”—That is the kind of proposition that one re-
peats to oneself countless times. One thinks that one is tracing the outline 
of the thing’s nature over and over again, and one is merely tracing round 
the frame through which we look at it. A picture held us captive. And we 
could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to 
repeat it to us inexorably.31
Liberation can take place if the members of the supervisory group are able 
to understand the preunderstanding from which my actual story grows. By 
telling their own stories in different ways about what they have heard and 
thought, they can help me see. This means that we develop an understand-
ing that is mutual and a new creation. Only when we get this common un-
derstanding of the theme of the story can we work out new understandings 
and solutions. This view that is held in common enables me to reflect on my 
own understanding and determine whether it is still a legitimate point of 
view for me.
In the course of supervision, as we have shown, I will produce new sto-
ries thanks to all those new voices that I hear from the others and my mak-
ing them part of my own reflection. Thereby, I produce a new story where 
I am still the subject, even though it is a new story that might demand that 
I show myself as a more or less different person in the future, one who has 
more personal agency. This means that I will act according to the meaning 
developed through the new story supervision has helped create.
ConCLuding REfLECTionS
We have in this essay presented how we work as supervisors and how 
we think about supervision, with a special focus on reflection. We hope that 
this will be helpful for other professional supervisors so that their reflection 
on our ideas about supervision can reveal new perspectives on supervision 
and what the supervisor is doing. This, in turn, could perhaps stimulate 
new ways of doing old things.
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